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A TEXAS TAKINGS TRAP: HOW THE COURT 
IN EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY v. 
BRAGG FELL INTO A DANGEROUS PITFALL 
OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
JOSEPH BELZA* 
Abstract: In Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg, the Court of Appeals 
of Texas, San Antonio held that the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s water 
well permitting plan amounted to a compensable taking of a pecan 
farmer’s private property. The court determined that the water regula-
tion was so onerous that it was analogous to physical seizure of proper-
ty by eminent domain. In its analysis, however, the court fatally mis-
applied the multi-part Penn Central test. The court implicitly framed 
the four Penn Central factors as elements instead of utilizing a more 
appropriate holistic balancing test. Framing the test in such a way im-
properly stacks the deck in favor of the private interest. If other courts 
adopt the Bragg version of the Penn Central test, “regulatory takings” 
will expand beyond their reasonable bounds as a cause of action and 
disastrously undermine states’ ability to implement environmental reg-
ulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the increasingly arid American West, the scene is set for a bitter 
standoff between individual private landowners and state governments rep-
resenting the public.1 They are poised to struggle for extraction and use 
rights of the region’s most precious—and increasingly scarce—resource: 
water.2 California, for instance, finds itself facing a devastating “mega-
drought.”3 With surface water unavailable, industrial and agricultural con-
sumers have turned to groundwater.4 In an effort to sustain these dwindling 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 See Heesun Wee, California Landowners Resist Efforts to Monitor Groundwater, CNBC 
(May 13, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/12/the-growing-tension-over-california-
water-metering-.html [http://perma.cc/Y886-R3QC]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Julie Schmit & Elizabeth Weise, Californians Brace for Year of ‘Mega-Drought,’ USA 
TODAY (Feb. 5, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/02/04/
california-drought-economy/5043691/ [http://perma.cc/5GKQ-LFBK]. 
 4 Wee, supra note 1. 
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aquifers, California has begun to closely monitor consumption from private 
wells, asserting that this water is a public resource.5 
These politically charged California legal initiatives mirror the Ed-
wards Aquifer Act (the “Act”), originally enacted in drought-prone Texas 
two decades earlier.6 In an effort to mitigate the loss of exhaustible ground-
water and to stymy the flow out of rechargeable aquifers, the Texas state 
legislature established regulatory schemes that promote the conservation of 
water by controlling its use.7 In 1993, the Texas legislature created the Ed-
wards Aquifer Authority (“the Authority”) to maintain and preserve ground-
water in the aquifer that bears its name.8 The Authority accomplished this 
by capping the amount of groundwater an individual could tap and con-
sume.9 Many landowners considered this an unfair taking of their water, and 
in some instances attacked these conservation measures in court.10 
An archetypical example of such a legal battle sparked nearly a decade 
ago when the Authority implemented a groundwater conservation plan 
wherein individuals’ usage was capped by pumping permits, which pro-
posed limitations based on past water usage.11 Glenn and JoLynn Bragg, 
commercial pecan farmers in Central Texas, sued the Edwards Aquifer Au-
thority in 2006, alleging that the permitting system amounted to a physical 
seizure of their pecan orchards.12 They argued that the permitting scheme’s 
historical usage benchmark—static in nature—did not account for pecan 
trees, which have a dynamic necessity for water that increases as they ma-
ture.13 Essentially, they argued that because the water conservation regula-
tion partially diminished the usability of their land, they were entitled to 
compensation by the state.14 The trial court found for the Braggs, and the 
Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio affirmed, holding that the economic 
impact on the Bragg’s investment trumped the government’s interest in im-
plementing the regulation.15 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. 
 6 See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720–10736.6 (West 2015); Edwards Aquifer Authority 
Act of 1993, ch. 626, 1993 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350. 
 7 See TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id.; Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 125 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 10 See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 821 (Tex. 2012); Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 
at 126. 
 11 See TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350. 
 12 Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 126. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1979, Glenn and JoLynn Bragg purchased the Home Place Orchard, 
a sixty-acre parcel of land in central Texas.16 They utilized this land both as 
their homestead and as a commercial pecan orchard.17 To water the orchard, 
the Braggs tapped into the underlying water table of the Edwards Aquifer 
and installed a well and irrigation system.18 In 1983, the Braggs expanded 
their pecan operation by purchasing an additional orchard at a nearby forty-
two-acre property.19 Though non-Edwards Aquifer water initially irrigated 
this second orchard, it eventually outgrew the existing supply.20 To compen-
sate, the Braggs drilled another Edwards Aquifer well and connected it to an 
irrigation system.21 They completed this project in 1995.22 
Meanwhile, the Texas legislature focused on a new water conservation 
initiative.23 The state legislature recognized the economic and social interest 
tied to the preservation of the Edwards Aquifer, and in 1993, it passed the 
Act to manage and conserve it.24 In emphasizing the importance of conser-
vation, the language of the statute specifically highlights the aquifer’s con-
tributions to municipal drinking water supply, livestock watering, commer-
cial irrigation, use by firefighters, and aquatic recreation, among others.25 
The Act also created the Authority as the agency charged with administering 
the statute and empowered the Authority to implement a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme.26 The primary directive of the Authority was to limit the 
ever-increasing water consumption from wells tapping the aquifer.27 To 
achieve this, the Authority began to issue water-use permits to well owners, 
capping the volume of water an individual could pump from the aquifer in a 
given time period.28 This consumption cap was based on a well owner’s 
historical usage; in other words, the Authority determined one’s limit based 
on how much water she had used in years past.29 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Id. at 124. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Edwards Aquifer Authority Act of 1993, ch. 626, 1993 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350; Bragg, 
421 S.W.3d at 124. 
 25 See TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350. 
 26 See id.; Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 124–25. 
 27 See TEX. GEN. LAWS 2350; Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 124–25. 
 28 Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 125. 
 29 Id. 
214 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:211 
The Braggs complied with this new regulation and applied for well 
permits for each orchard.30 They requested, however, that their cap on the 
first orchard go beyond their historical usage because they anticipated the 
fact that the pecan trees would need more and more water as they matured.31 
Likewise, they requested an allowance of 193.12 acre-feet of water per year 
for the second orchard and well.32 The Authority rejected the Braggs’ re-
quests, instead granting a permit for 120.2 acre-feet a year for the first or-
chard and denying any permit for the second.33 
The Braggs believed that the Authority’s denial of their requests un-
fairly cut off the use of their land.34 Accordingly, they filed suit in Novem-
ber 2006, claiming that: (1) the Authority had violated their federal civil 
rights, and (2) the denial of the requested permits amounted to a compensa-
ble taking of their property.35 The suit was removed to federal court, where 
the court dismissed the federal civil rights claims and remanded the takings 
matter back to state court.36 In state court, the Braggs moved for summary 
judgment on the takings claim, and the Authority counter-moved for sum-
mary judgment.37 The trial court granted the Braggs’ motion and dismissed 
that of the Authority, concluding that the permitting regulation amounted to 
a compensable regulatory taking.38 A bench trial was then held to determine 
the amount of compensation due, and the court determined that the Authori-
ty owed $597,575.00 for the first well and orchard and $134,918.40 for the 
second.39 Both parties appealed, the Braggs seeking a reevaluation of the 
compensation due and the Authority seeking a reversal of the finding of a 
taking.40 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the finding of a 
regulatory taking, reasoning that the regulation disrupted the Braggs’ in-
vestment-backed expectations and had an adverse economic impact.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Takings jurisprudence has its foundation in the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and a series of late twentieth-century United States 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. at 126. 
 31 Id. at 126, 140. The Bragg’s past water consumption at the first orchard peaked at 120.2 
acre-feet, but they requested an expanded cap of 228.85 acre-feet of water per year. Id. at 126. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 126, 137. 
 41 Id. at 139, 142, 146. 
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Supreme Court cases.42 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment dic-
tates that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”43 An actual physical confiscation of private property—the 
kind exemplified by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.—most 
clearly triggers this constitutional protection.44 The second class of taking—
established in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council—occurs when a 
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.45 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme 
Court held that a regulation can still amount to a compensable taking even 
absent a physical confiscation, and even if there remains a beneficial use in 
the property.46 The Court in Penn Central identified several factors to be 
considered in such a takings analysis, including: (1) the economic impact of 
the regulation, (2) investment-backed expectations of the property owner(s), 
and (3) the nature of the regulation.47 
The test set forth in Penn Central ultimately proved to be somewhat 
difficult to administer; accordingly, years later, the Court clarified the nature 
of the test in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.48 In that case, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor explained that Penn Central cannot be a mathematically precise 
test.49 Justice O’Connor further warned that it is inappropriate to apply the 
test too rigidly, and one should instead consider all of the circumstances in 
context.50 Ultimately, according to Justice O’Connor, the Penn Central test 
is a careful but imprecise balancing of the private interest versus the public 
interest at issue in each case.51 
The Supreme Court of Texas reinforced these ideas in Hallco Texas, 
Inc. v. McMullen County.52 Echoing Justice O’Connor’s language in 
Palazzolo, the court held that the three explicit Penn Central factors are an 
incomplete analysis on their own.53 A correct Penn Central test considers 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 143 (1978). 
 43 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 44 See 458 U.S. at 426. In Loretto, a New York statute required certain property owners to 
allow cable companies to install and maintain components on their property. Id. at 421. The Court 
held for the plaintiff landlord, reasoning that any permanent physical occupation authorized by the 
government constitutes a compensable taking. Id. at 426. 
 45 See 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 46 438 U.S. at 143. 
 47 Id. at 124. 
 48 See 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 
at 124. 
 49 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634–36. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. at 636. 
 52 See 221 S.W.3d 50, 75 (Tex. 2007). 
 53 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635–36; Hallco Tex., Inc., 221 S.W.3d at 75. 
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all of the surrounding circumstances, including the three factors.54 Essen-
tially, the Hallco court held that a proper Penn Central test is a broad ques-
tion of fairness, weighing private and public interests in totality.55 
In Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, the Texas Supreme Court applied 
Penn Central takings jurisprudence directly to the Edwards Aquifer Author-
ity (“The Authority”) water allocation regulations.56 Though the Authority 
in Day argued that being forced to compensate for its water conservation 
initiatives would be disastrous to the public, the court found that such regu-
lations could indeed amount to takings.57 In essence, the court in Day held 
that it was proper to scrutinize the Authority’s regulations under a Penn 
Central lens.58 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg, the Court of Appeals of Texas, 
San Antonio held that the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s (“the Authority”) 
pumping permit scheme amounted to a compensable taking of the Braggs’ 
property.59 The court determined that the regulation was so onerous that it 
was analogous to a physical seizure of the orchards by eminent domain.60 In 
its analysis, the Court of Appeals segmented the Penn Central test into three 
major parts—the economic impact of the regulations, investment-backed ex-
pectations of the landowners, and the nature of the regulation—and applied 
each question in sequence.61 The court also added and applied a very brief 
fourth section to consider additional contextual factors.62 The court implicitly 
applied these four Penn Central inquiries as elements, instead of utilizing a 
test that balances the public interest directly against the private interest.63 
Such an application of Penn Central conflicts with the holistic nature of the 
test and inherently favors landowners in cases of alleged regulatory takings.64 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Hallco Tex., Inc., 221 S.W.3d at 75. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See 369 S.W.3d 814, 843 (Tex. 2012); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 
138 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 57 Day, 369 S.W.3d at 843, 845. 
 58 See id. 
 59 421 S.W.3d at 146. 
 60 See id. Under the doctrine of “eminent domain,” a governmental entity has the inherent 
power to take privately owned property, especially land, and convert it to public use, subject to 
reasonable compensation for the taking. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 61 Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 139–46. 
 62 Id. at 145–46. 
 63 See id. at 139–46. 
 64 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Hall-
co Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 75 (Tex. 2007); Bragg, 421 S.W. 3d. at 146. 
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The Court of Appeals first found that the economic impact of the regula-
tion was substantial enough to weigh in favor of the Braggs.65 There is no 
standard numerical benchmark, but the court found it significant that the 
Braggs’ cost of irrigation increased by approximately ten percent and that 
they had to scale back their orchards by thirty to fifty percent.66 Second, the 
court held that the Braggs made investments into this property on which they 
could reasonably expect returns.67 Bragg knew when he bought the orchards 
that the pecan operation would require large amounts of water.68 Because he 
had a degree in agricultural economics, the court deferred to his understand-
ing of the pecan endeavor, and held that his expectation of a return on his ex-
penditures was reasonable.69 
The third prong of the Penn Central test, the “nature of the regulation,” 
landed in favor of the Authority because the government has a weighty inter-
est in conserving and regulating water use, especially in arid conditions.70 
Finally, the “other considerations” factor weighed in favor of the Braggs.71 
The court concluded that the Braggs had an especially important stake in the 
groundwater because on a drought-ridden Texan landscape, water is scarce 
and unpredictably available.72 Overall, the court found that the water permit 
regulation amounted to a taking for which the Braggs were entitled to com-
pensation.73 
Although the Court of Appeals parroted the language of established tak-
ings case law, its application of the Penn Central test was clumsy and mis-
guided.74 The court in Bragg quoted the admonition Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor made in Palazzolo to avoid “mathematically precise variables” in 
questions of regulatory takings, but it ultimately failed to heed her warn-
ing.75 The court may not have made the mistake of setting hard numerical 
benchmarks, but it misapplied the Penn Central test by converting it into an 
overly methodical checking of boxes.76 Addressing the four factors one at a 
time, the Court determined that factors one, two, and four “weigh[] heavily 
in favor” of a finding of a compensable taking while question three “weighs 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 141. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Id. at 144. 
 68 Id. at 143–44. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. at 144–45. 
 71 Id. at 145–46. 
 72 Id. at 146. 
 73 Id.; see infra notes 74–99 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 139–46. 
 75 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Bragg, 421 S.W. 3d at 139–46. 
 76 Bragg, 421 S.W. 3d at 139–46. 
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heavily against [such a finding].”77 After analyzing the four prongs individ-
ually, the court offered a single sentence conclusion holding that the regula-
tion amounted to a compensable taking.78 This terse conclusion lacks fur-
ther explanation and suggests that the court applied a tallying test, rather 
than a more nuanced balancing test.79 In essence, it found that the landown-
er must succeed because three points went to the landowner and only one 
point went to the agency.80 This analysis is off-base because the four Penn 
Central factors are not points on a scorecard; rather, they are factors to con-
sider when weighing the private individual’s interest against that of the pub-
lic.81 
Interestingly, the Texas court concedes that the government is “unques-
tionably” empowered to regulate groundwater because “[r]egulation is essen-
tial to its conservation and use.”82 This acknowledgement of the govern-
ment’s imperative interest and the public’s significant stake in this regulation 
makes the final holding all the more troubling.83 If the public’s interest in a 
lasting water supply is so significant, why do the consumption rights of a sin-
gle farmer overcome it?84 The court in Bragg leaves this vital question unan-
swered.85 There is no meaningful explanation of why the individual’s interests 
outweigh the harm done to the public; the court simply states that they do.86 
It is unclear if a more thoughtful application of the Penn Central test 
would necessarily change the ultimate outcome of the case.87 It would, 
however, force the court to confront more directly the harm to the public 
and explain why the public good must be secondary to a private right.88 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 141, 144–46. 
 78 Id. at 146. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. at 141, 144–46. 
 81 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 75 (Tex. 2007); Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 146. 
 82 See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 144–45. 
 83 See id. at 145–46. 
 84 See id. at 145. 
 85 See generally id. (failing to explicitly weigh the public interest directly against the Braggs’ 
interest). 
 86 See id. at 146. While the water consumption of a single pecan farming operation may not 
seem immediately alarming, the effect of unchecked commercial water use in the aggregate may 
prove disastrous, especially in a semi-arid region prone to drought. See Abby Sewell, Supervisors 
Approve Temporary Vineyard Ban in Santa Monica Mountains, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2015, 6:26 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-county-vineyards-ban-20150616-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/X2LT-E4C4] (“[T]he point is: the aggregate of everybody’s actions is contrib-
uting [to the drought conditions] . . . .”). 
 87 See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 146. 
 88 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 75 (Tex. 2007); Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 146. 
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The Bragg version of the test—more of a scorecard than a scale—is 
fundamentally flawed because it artificially segments parts of the analysis.89 
The Penn Central analysis should consider all of the public interests on one 
side and weigh them against the private interest on the other.90 “Investment-
backed expectations” and “economic impact” overlap and should be grouped 
into the private interest side of the analysis.91 
By separating the questions of investment-backed expectations and eco-
nomic impact, the court in Bragg has stacked the deck in favor of the land-
owner.92 Because investment-backed expectations and economic impact are 
so closely linked, if a court determines one points to a compensable taking, 
the other surely will, as well.93 The Penn Central scorecard will already show 
two points for the private individual.94 The nature of the regulation, represent-
ing a single point, could almost never overcome this two-point lead.95 The 
addition of the fourth “other considerations” factor could have complicated 
this calculus, but the nature of that catchall inquiry is so broad and ambiguous 
that the court in Bragg only gave it superficial treatment.96 
If courts come to adopt the Bragg model of the Penn Central test, the 
implications could prove disastrous.97 A precedent that inherently favors an 
individual’s property rights would undermine the government’s ability to reg-
ulate vital resources.98 In the point-tallying model, the public interest, no mat-
ter how significant, cannot outweigh the interest of an individual who: (1) is 
economically impacted and (2) has his or her investment-backed expectations 
disappointed.99 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg illustrates the dan-
gerous opacity of takings jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals of Texas, San 
Antonio understood the general direction and broad boundaries of the Penn 
Central test. Nevertheless, it applied the test with an indelicate hand, tallying 
points instead of carefully balancing interests. Separating the factors and 
framing the test as a scorecard is illogical. The first two factors—the econom-
ic impact of the regulation, and the regulation’s interference with investment-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 146. 
 90 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635–36; Hallco Tex., Inc., 221 S.W.3d at 75. 
 91 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635–36; Hallco Tex., Inc., 221 S.W.3d at 75. 
 92 See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 139–44, 146. 
 93 See id. at 139–44. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. at 139–46. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
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backed expectations—naturally overlap and will almost always favor the 
same party. If other courts adopt the Bragg interpretation of the Penn Central 
test, the doctrine of invalid regulatory takings will expand beyond its reason-
able bounds. The resultant obligation by government agencies to compensate 
the individuals and industries they regulate could cripple lawmaking efforts, 
especially environmental regulation. 
